I. INTRODUCTION The United States Supreme Court recently decided two cases, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.' and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius. 2 Both cases presented similar questions with regard to the applicability of the First Amendment's "Free Exercise Clause" 3 to corporations. In Hobby Lobby, the Tenth Circuit found that Free Exercise rights existed for a corporation, without regard to its status as a non-church, profit-seeking entity.' In Conestoga, however, the Third Circuit agreed that a corporation could have Free Exercise rights, but such rights did not apply if the corporation happened to be "secular" and "for-profit," 5 defining characteristics which appear nowhere in the Constitution and are contrary to recent First Amendment jurisprudence and other precedent, including the seminal case of Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.'
Why would there be such a distinction relating to a right as fundamental as the exercise of religion? According to the Conestoga court, it all comes down to profit.' A legal entity that exists to produce profits for those who organized it cannot exercise religion, but one that exists without an interest in profits miraculously is vested with the right to exercise religion In Hobby Lobby, the Tenth Circuit summarized (and subsequently rejected) the government's position as being a blackand-white distinction between non-profit religious organizations, which have Free Exercise rights, and for-profit secular organizations, which have no such rights. 9 The government made the same argument in refers to as "de facto B-Corps." The broader issues of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the Establishment Clause, and other First Amendment issues relating to corporations generally, are outside the scope of this paper.S II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONESTOGA DECISION Conestoga, like Hobby Lobby, involves a challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's requirement that employers provide insurance that includes a broad array of reproductive health benefits.'
9 At issue in both cases is the requirement that employer-provided insurance 0 cover certain drugs that interfere with the natural life cycle of a fertilized egg (the "ACA Contraceptive Mandate"). The employers in both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga are closely-held corporations owned by individuals with strong religious convictions, and those religious convictions guide the operation of each business.
2 ' Both employers believe that the ACA The Greens operate Hobby Lobby and Mardel through a management trust (of which each Green is a trustee), and that trust is likewise governed by religious principles. The trust exists "to honor God with all that has been entrusted" to the Greens and to "use the Green family assets to create, support, and leverage the efforts of Christian ministries." The trustees must sign "a Trust Commitment," which among other things requires them to affirm the Green family statement of faith and to "regularly seek to maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in His Word and prayer." See also Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 382 n.5 (citations omitted):
[O]n October 31, 2012, Conestoga's Board of Directors adopted "The Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life," which provides, amongst other things, that "The Hahn Family believes that human life begins at conception (at the point where an egg and sperm unite) and that it is a sacred gift from God and only God has the right to terminate human life. Therefore, it is against our moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life through abortion, suicide, euthanasia, murder, or any other acts that involve the taking of human life."
Contraceptive Mandate required them to violate their religious beliefs by providing insurance that enables the termination of a human life. 2 The Third Circuit majority in Conestoga hewed to a strict interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, differentiating a religious, non-profit corporation, which the majority believed would have Free Exercise rights, from a secular, for-profit corporation, which the majority said was never contemplated by the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. 23 The Conestoga majority explicitly disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's theory in the Hobby Lobby decision, though it did not provide a discussion of why it disagreed." Instead, the Conestoga court stated, based on its understanding of the history and purpose of the First Amendment, that Free Exercise rights are unique to individuals. 25 In fact, the Conestoga court's conclusion was not so simple. 26 The Conestoga court initially stated that it "must consider the history of the Free Exercise Clause and determine whether there is a similar history of courts providing free exercise protection to corporations," 27 and in the next sentence concluded that there was no such protection. 8 Then the court contradicted its conclusion by finding that a corporation could indeed have Free Exercise protections, but not if that corporation was secular and for-profit. 29 This is so, the court said, because a corporation is not capable of exercising religion. Confusing things even more, the Conestoga court admitted that churches, which are often corporations, and "other religious entities," a term which was not defined, do have Free Exercise rights. 3 The Conestoga decision hinged on the idea that one type of corporation can exercise religion while another cannot. 2 Creating a new category of corporation out of thin air, or perhaps by repeating the phrase See id. at 385 ("We will not draw the conclusion that, just because courts have recognized the free exercise rights of churches and other religious entities, it necessarily follows that for-profit, secular corporations can exercise religion.").
Vol. 39 "secular corporation" throughout the course of its opinion, the Conestoga court re-wrote First Amendment jurisprudence by finding that there was such a thing as a "secular" corporation, which only had partial First Amendment rights. 3 Presumably, a secular corporation is any corporation that is not a church or religious entity. 4 Neither Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ("Hobby Lobby Inc.") nor Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation ("Conestoga Corp.") was incorporated as a church, but it is clear that they both operate according to the religious principles of their respective owners. 5 So to call either corporation "secular" is to ignore the common meaning of the word. 6 
III. DOES FREE EXERCISE COVER CORPORATIONS ORGANIZED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES?
This creates a conundrum. Assuming, for purposes of this paper, that a "secular, for-profit" corporation can indeed be denied Free Exercise rights, but a "religious entity" is protected, how can the two be distinguished?
Because the Conestoga court did not define "secular," one must assume that it meant for the term to retain its common meaning. 7 The Random House Webster's dictionary defines "secular" as "of or pertaining to worldly things or to things not regarded as sacred; temporal." 38 To bolster its position that there is a legal distinction for First Amendment purposes between "secular" and "religious" corporations, the Conestoga majority cited a recently decided Free Exercise case for the proposition that "the text of the First 33See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (admitting that there is ample prccedent for finding that religious organizations, including corporations, as opposed to individuals, have Free Exercise rights, but concluding that, in those cases, the party being granted such rights was not a "secular, for-profit" corporation).
34
Cf. id. (suggesting a contrast between "for-profit, secular" corporations and "churches and other religious entities" churches, which are non-profit entities, there are many hospitals, nursing homes, and similar institutions, which are operated for-profit. 4 So, under this rationale, a for-profit hospital that focused on serving the needs of Christians would just as surely be a "religious organization" as would a traditional church. 4 6 The Fourth 47 and Eighth" Circuits also adhere to this definition.
Though the foregoing cases focused on the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws, the exception is based on the general guarantee of religious freedom in the First Amendment. The Hollins court explained:
The ministerial exception, a doctrine rooted in the First Amendment's guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of those employees." 0
The Supreme Court, in Hosanna-Tabor, traced the ministerial exception to a Fifth Circuit case that found the ministerial exception was based on the Free Exercise Clause."
So while the Conestoga majority could not find case law to support the assertion that "for-profit, secular" corporations can exercise religion, there is more than adequate support for the fact that courts have frequently found employers similarly situated to Hobby Lobby Inc. and Conestoga Corp.-in the sense that they are not churches-to be 327, 330-31 (1987) . Justice Brennan explained the blanket Establishment clause protection for non-profits as follows:
The risk of chilling religious organizations is most likely to arise with respect to nonprofit activities. The fact that an operation is not organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular in orientation. In contrast to a for-profit corporation, a nonprofit organization must utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of the goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute any surplus to the owners. This makes plausible a church's contention that an entity is not operated simply in order to generate revenues for the church, but that the activities themselves are infused with a religious purpose. Nonprofit activities therefore are most likely to present cases in which characterization of the activity as religious or secular will be a close question. If there is a danger that a religious organization will be deterred from classifying as religious those activities it actually regards as religious, it is likely to be in this domain. This substantial potential for chilling religious activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination of the character of a nonprofit organization, and justifies a categorical exemption for nonprofit activities. Such an exemption demarcates a sphere of deference with respect to those activities most likely to be religious. It permits infringement on employee free exercise rights in those instances in which discrimination is most likely to reflect a religious community's self-definition. While not every nonprofit activity may be operated for religious purposes, the likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable means to avoid chilling the exercise of religion. Id. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Vol. 39 of corporate religious belief." Consequently, the First Amendment's religion clause protections for non-profits has historically been a matter of expediency and deference to entities providing community service "as a means of fulfilling religious duties." 56 There is nothing inherently unique about the non-profit entity for these purposes.
7
Moreover, there is nothing that excludes corporate Free Exercise rights from these protections. 8 As Justice Brennan noted in Amos, "[als a result, determining whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. . . . Furthermore, this prospect of government intrusion raises concern that a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity."" As the dissent in Conestoga points out, more than one of the concurring justices in Amos acknowledged that it is "conceivable that some for-profit activities could have a religious character" that would give rise to First Amendment religion clause protections." Since Amos (and its presumption that non-profits were religious actors for First Amendment purposes) was decided before the creation of the B-Corp, it is likely that the Amos court would have provided the same blanket presumption to B-Corps organized for religious purposes. ' In fact, while the Conestoga majority opinion does not mention Amos, the Conestoga dissent points out that during oral arguments, the government argued Amos signaled a Supreme Court doctrine of providing religion clause protections only to non-profits. 62 It is likely that the Conestoga 55See id. at 339 (discussing the interest in avoiding an "intrusive inquiry" into a company's religious views).
56Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring 
(2014).
61Amos, 483 U.S. at 345-46 (Brennan, J., concurring):
Concern for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that we avoid the entanglement and the chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determination would produce. We cannot escape the fact that these aims arc in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I believe that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately balances these competing concerns. 62Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 405-06 n.19 (Jordan, J., dissenting): DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW majority, like the government, misunderstood Amos in the same way.
63
Amos actually stands for the proposition that non-profits, due to the likelihood that they are organized for primarily religious purposes, are presumed to be capable of exercising religion and thus subject to Free Exercise protections, while for-profit corporations would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis, since they operate primarily for profit.'
It would be impractical for courts to engage in a case-by-case determination of the character of a corporation to determine if it is "religious," as that would thrust courts into a role outside of their traditional milieu." However, it would be impermissible for courts to adopt a doctrine that results in the categorical denial of Free Exercise rights simply because a corporation is not a non-profit. 6 This would be especially true if a for-profit corporation were formed to pursue religious purposes and, by law, had a duty to pursue those religious purposes at the cost of profits. 7 Since Amos, a new type of corporation has emerged-one that is not a non-profit but is duty-bound to operate for purposes, including religious purposes, other than mere profit."
During oral argument, counsel for the governmcnt relied on that characterization of Amos to imply for the first time that granting any free exercise rights to a for-profit corporation would inevitably trigger Establishment Clause problems .... Amos did not turn on a for-profit versus non-profit distinction, and, in fact, the Court left open any question regarding the Establishment Clause impact of granting a religious exemption to a forprofit corporation. 63See id. at 384-85 (discussing the fact that for-profit corporations have not enjoyed free exercise rights); supra note 62 and accompanying text.
64
See Amos, 483 U.S. at 345 n.6: It is also conceivable that some for-profit activities could have a religious character, so that religious discrimination with respect to these activities would be justified in some cases. The cases before us, however, involve a nonprofit organization; I believe that a categorical exemption authorizing discrimination is particularly appropriate for such entities, because claims that they possess a religious dimension will be especially colorable. 65See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2013) (discussing the "religious question" doctrine as an example of courts refusing to be drawn into matters relating to religious practice).
66See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772-73 (2014) (discussing cases permitting for-profit corporation to exercise religion).
67 See id. at 2771 (discussing benefit corporations).
See id. at 2771-72.
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IV. THE CONESTOGA DISSENT Though the Conestoga majority ignored the long history of religious organizations of all types being afforded Free Exercise rights, Judge Jordan's dissent artfully and thoroughly explained the deficiencies in the court's opinion. 9 In particular, and most importantly, Judge Jordan debunked the idea that only non-profit corporations possessed Free Exercise rights.
7 " Getting to the heart of the flaws in the majority's opinion, Judge Jordan concisely exposed the illogicality of agreeing that individuals have Free Exercise rights while denying them those rights when they act in association with one another for some purposes but not for others. [for the proposition that for-profit corporations enjoy Free Exercise rights], but the conclusory assertion that a corporation has no constitutional right to free exercise of religion is also unsupported by any cited authority." (citations omitted)).
And what is the rationale for this "I can't see you" analysis? It is that for-profit corporations like Conestoga were "created to make money." It is the profit-making character of the corporation, not the corporate form itself, that the Majority treats as decisively disqualifying Conestoga from seeking the protections of the First Amendment or RFRA ....
That argument treats the line between profit-motivated and non-profit entities as much brighter than it actually is, since for-profit corporations pursue non-profit goals on a regular basis. More important for present purposes, however, the kind of distinction the majority draws between for-profit corporations and non-profit corporations has been considered and expressly rejected in other First Amendment cases.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, for example, the Supreme Court said, "[bly suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests." . . . Because the First Amendment protects speech and religious activity generally, an entity's profit-seeking motive is not sufficient to defeat its speech or free exercise claims. While Judge Jordan's reasoning is backed by both logic and law, there is a facial internal contradiction between his initial concession that corporations do not have the same constitutional rights as individuals and his subsequent dismissal of the importance of the identity of the person or entity claiming the right. 74 If it is true that a corporation's constitutional rights are limited, 75 then there must be some way to determine whether, for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the corporation's acts are religious in nature. In other words, if a large corporation seeks Free Exercise protection in deciding not to provide a benefit that it claims conflicts with its religious ideals, how can it be determined whether that corporation is truly exercising religion or simply looking for a pretext to eliminate an expense? To answer this question, the Conestoga majority inverted the presumption from the Amos The First Amendment does not say that only one kind of corporation enjoys this right. The First Amendment does not say that only religious corporations or only not-for-profit corporations are protected. The First Amendment does not authorize Congress to pick and choose the persons or the entities or the organizational forms that are free to exercise their religion. All persons-and under our Constitution all corporations are persons-are free. A statute cannot subtract from their freedom. 72Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 400 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
I am not suggesting that corporations enjoy all of the same constitutionally grounded rights as individuals do. They do not, as the Supreme Court noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, saying, "[c]crtain purely personal guarantees ... are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the historic function of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals." . . . The question in a case like this thus becomes "[wihether or not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal."' ... And that, in turn, "depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." 73 1d. at 403. 14See id. ("[T]he right to object on religious grounds to funding someone else's reproductive choices is no less legitimate because the objector is a corporation rather than an individual."). 75 1d. at 383 (describing how corporations do not enjoy some "purely personal" constitutional rights).
Vol. 39 concurrence. 76 That is, the Conestoga court reasoned that if a non-profit is presumed to be a religious organization for First Amendment religion clause purposes, then a for-profit should be presumed to be a nonreligious organization." This logical flaw is likely the unstated source of the Conestoga majority's non-profit/for-profit distinction, and it forces the government into a position of presumptively chilling religious exercise." Judge Jordan hinted at the solution to this conundrum in a footnote, in which he briefly discussed the creation of B-Corps and the new dimension they add to the corporate purpose inquiry. 9
V. THE NEW REALITY: B-CORPS BLUR THE TRADITIONAL LINES BETWEEN FOR-PROFIT AND NON-PROFITS
Though Judge Jordan's reference to B-Corps was only a footnote to his argument against the majority's baseless for-profit/non-profit distinction," the reference highlighted a critical problem with the majority's outdated and rigid view of corporations. 8 Until recently, it was true that there was a rather stark difference between a corporation formed as a non-profit and one formed as a for-profit. 82 The primary difference was the permitted activities of the traditional for-profit 76See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345-46 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I believe that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately balances these competing concerns.").
77Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 386, 388 (noting non-profit churches enjoy free exercise rights, but concluding for-profit secular corporations do not). (2014) (contending that under the existing legal paradigm, the distinction between for-profits and non-profits is false, and corporations are not precluded from having free exercise rights by virtue of being for-profit).
79See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 403 n.18 (Jordan, J., dissenting) ("[R]ecent developments in corporate law regarding 'Benefit' or 'B' corporations significantly undermine the narrow view that all for-profit corporations are concerned with profit maximization alone.").
8°Judge Jordan pointed out that many corporations spend significant corporate time and resources pursuing non-profit goals that benefit myriad constituencies, just like religious organizations do. See id. at 403-04 n. 18. In illustrating this point, Judge Jordan referred to the new hybrid profit/benefit corporate entity permitted to be formed by a number of states, the B- can by guided by both the profit motive and social goals when making business decisions). 82 See id. At this point, I will use the phrase "traditional for-profit corporation" in reference to for-profit corporations that are not B-Corps.
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Vol. 39 corporation. 3 A traditional for-profit corporation ultimately had to be operated to enhance shareholder value. 4 Enhancing shareholder value does not necessarily mean increasing the short term profitability of the traditional for-profit corporation." The debate surrounding whether profit maximization is truly the duty of a traditional for-profit corporation's board of directors has been thoroughly described in numerous cases and articles and is thus outside the scope of this paper." This paper is based on the conclusion that while mid and long term profit maximization may not always be the desire of a traditional for-profit corporation's shareholders, as a matter of law that is the default standard where a traditional for-profit corporation's shareholder base is diverse. "7 In closely-held traditional for-profit corporations, such as Hobby Lobby Inc. or Conestoga Corp., the shareholders often choose some goal other than profit maximization and thus voluntarily act against their own financial interests since they have foregone profit maximization. " If, however, the shareholders were subsequently to disagree on the desired goal of the corporation, with one group seeking profit maximization and See id. at 155. In this essay, then-Chancellor, now Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court, arguably the preeminent authority on corporate law in the United States, outlines the duties of the board of directors of a for-profit corporation in a modern context. Id. Chief Justice Strine concludes, "I do not mean to imply that the corporate law requires directors to maximize short-term profits for stockholders. Rather, I simply indicate that the corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders." Id. 85 See id. the other seeking another goal, the presumption of most courts would be in favor of profit maximization." Consequently, unlike a non-profit corporation, if a traditional forprofit corporation sought to do something along the lines of promoting religion, it would have to do so as a secondary goal."° To the extent the promotion of religion were to negatively and materially deviate from the interests of the shareholders, the shareholders would have a number of claims against that traditional for-profit corporation's board of directors.
9
The co-founder of B Lab, 92 Jay Coen Gilbert, explained the limitations of the status quo as:
Currently, individuals and groups seeking to establish organizations with a public mission can either organize themselves as not-for-profit corporations, or use a traditional for-profit corporate form. In the case of non-profits, there are numerous restrictions on the nature of their activities, and non-profits are thus extremely limited in their ability to attract capital to allow them to achieve their mission at scale. In the case of traditional for profit corporations, such businesses are generally required under the current statutory and case law to be conducted for the benefit of the shareholders to whom the directors owe a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value, thus limiting their ability to consider the interests of their employees, communities, or the environment.
3 89See Sharfman, supra note 86, at 391 ("Given this majority view, it should come as no surprise that many practitioners and scholars also consider shareholder wealth maximization to be the objective of corporate law .... ").
90See Strine, supra note 83, at 154-55 (explaining that although entrepreneurs may have unique social or religious values which they want to promote, when an investor entrusts money to the company in order to maximize profits, it is not legitimate to further the entrepreneur's personal goals if to do so interferes with profit maximization Chancery had to determine whether Craigslist, a traditional for-profit corporation, that operated with a focus on providing community services rather than profit, could take corporate actions that elevated the preservation of a "culture" (i.e., providing free services to various communities) over providing a return on investment to all shareholders.
95
In deciding that the majority shareholders of Craigslist had breached their fiduciary duties to the minority shareholder, Chancellor Chandler cogently set forth the distinction between a traditional for-profit corporation and a non-profit corporation:
[The majority stockholders] did prove that they personally believe craigslist should not be about the business of stockholder wealth maximization, now or in the future. As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an organization seeking to aid local, national, and global communities by providing a website for online classifieds that is largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally appreciate and admire [the majority stockholders'] desire to be of service to communities. The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment. [The majority stockholders] opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars... as part of a transaction whereby [the capital's source] became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the [] directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The "Inc." after the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as (quoting Jay Coen Gilbert, Remarks on White/Leach Benefit Corporation Bill upon Introduction to the Pennsylvania State Senate I (Feb. 7, 2011) In the context of Free Exercise jurisprudence and the forprofit/non-profit dichotomy created by the Conestoga majority, the key difference between a B-Corp and a closely held traditional for-profit corporation is that the shareholders of a B-Corp can take action to compel the corporation to engage in the social benefit goals it was founded to achieve (even if such activities are at the expense of profits), while a traditional for-profit corporation's shareholders can only compel the corporation to maximize profits. 2 This distinction upends the Conestoga majority's for-profit/non-profit, secular/religious Free Exercise doctrine.' 3 The B-Corp fills the structural gap between the nonprofit described by Justice Brennan in Amos,"u and the for-profits, like Conestoga Corp. and Hobby Lobby, Inc.' 5 As such, the B-Corp, like non-profits, should benefit from the same presumption of exercise of (1) directly by the benefit corporation; or (2) derivatively by: (i) a person or group of persons that owned beneficially or of record at least 2% of the total number of shares of a class or series outstanding at the time of the act or omission complained of; (ii) a director; (iii) a person or group of persons that owned beneficially or of record 5% or more of the outstanding equity interests in an entity of which the benefit corporation is a subsidiary at the time of the act or omission complained of; (iv) or other persons as specified in the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the benefit corporation.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c).
' 03 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
04See supra note 54 and accompanying text. '
05
See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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religion so long as its corporate purpose is stated to be for religious benefit. 06
VII. WHAT MAKES A B-CORP UNIQUE?
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that in almost all cases, corporations are formed under and governed by state, not federal, law.' 7 The history and operations of each state's corporation law is well beyond the scope of this paper and for the most part irrelevant to the purpose of this paper.' 8
In certain fundamental ways, B-Corps and traditional corporations (both for-profit and non-profit) share a common core in that they are all creatures of state corporation codes."' 9 What is important for this paper, however, is how a B-Corp substantively differs from a traditional for-profit corporation in ways that matter for Free Exercise purposes. While a B-Corp is technically a for-profit corporation, it differs from a traditional for-profit corporation in many ways."
' Most germane to the purpose of this paper is the primacy of social benefit over profit and the third party influence over a B-Corp's The benefit corporation laws of each state position the benefit corporation statutory regime within the context of the state's general corporations law, unlike the flexible purpose corporation (FPC), which has been adopted as a standalone entity with no necessary relationship to the general corporations law. This is advantageous for the benefit corporation because it allows each state's body of corporate governance law-most of which is useful to the operation of any business-to still apply to benefit corporations. Moreover, it allows the benefit corporation's body of corporate governance law to interact with and, to the extent that they are consistent, be updated by the cases and developments in other areas of the state's corporate governance law. While the benefit corporation statute is new, and therefore inheres some legal risk in the uncertainty of how courts will interpret the statute, there is, arguably, comparatively much less risk than in an FPC because the benefit corporation statute still sits upon the bedrock of the remainder of the corporate governance laws. operations to ensure that it is operated in a socially beneficially manner. I I I B-Corp statutes generally require the board of directors to consider the effects of their decisions on any of the following:
the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation; (iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose." 2 The drafters of the Model B-Corp Code made it abundantly clear that the duty to maximize profits was a relic of traditional for-profit corporate governance and that B-Corps would not be limited to such pecuniary goals."' In the comment to Section 301(a)(l) of the Model B-Corp Code, the drafts explicitly stated:
This section is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit corporation. By requiring the consideration of interests of constituencies other than the shareholders, the section rejects the holdings in Dodge v. Ford and eBay Domestic 113See id.; see also Callison, supra note 110, at 145 (recognizing corporations often sacrifice profitability when pursuing the public good, and therefore the B-Corp model can be adopted to protect directors from fiduciary claims which could arise in a traditional corporation).
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Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, that directors must maximize the financial value of a corporation." 4 If there were any doubt as to whether a B-Corp is more like a non-profit than a traditional for-profit corporation for Free Exercise purposes, the rejection of the duty to maximize profits and the creation of a duty to act in a manner that creates social benefits that are embedded within the Model B-Corp Code should convince even the Conestoga majority that a B-Corp is the fraternal twin to the non-profit, while being a mere distant cousin to the traditional for-profit corporation."' If eBay stands for the proposition a traditional for-profit corporation "cannot . . . defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization,""..
6 then the Model B-Corp Code clearly stands for the proposition that directors in a B-Corp can defend a business strategy that does not involve stockholder wealth maximization, such as pursuing a religious purpose.
Based on the plain language of the Model B-Corp Code, a BCorp is the functional twin of a non-profit for Free Exercise analyses." 7 This leads to the question of how a B-Corp can have a "religious purpose" similar to that of a non-profit, like a church. A traditional forprofit corporation is formed with a "purpose" statement in its certificate of incorporation." 8 Though the "purpose" statement is a statutorily required term," 9 it is almost always in the most general terms possible.
2°T
he Delaware General Corporation Law, for example, states:
It shall be sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which 327, 334-35 (1987) (discussing free exercise rights in the context of non-profit corporations).
118See, eg., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 102(a)(3) (2011). Though some jurisdictions refer to this document as the "articles of incorporation," the substantive elements of the two are virtually identical. As a result, the term "certificate of incorporation" in this paper also refers to articles of incorporation, as applicable. See id. at 9. The author of this paper has spent over seventeen years practicing in the area of corporate finance and during that time formed a large number of corporations, including special purpose entities. In the author's practice, special purpose entities were formed in the context of joint ventures in which a specific line of business was to be pursued. For example, the author was involved in the privatization of military housing, where the United States Government formed a joint venture with a private developer to redevelop military housing and then act as the property manager for the renovated housing units. In such a case, the joint venture entity was formed with a purpose statement that limited the company to activities that were directly related to redeveloping and managing rental housing on military bases. Since a certificate of incorporation is filed with the secretary of state of the relevant jurisdiction, the use of a limited purpose statement puts all third parties on notice of the proper purposes of the corporation and, theoretically, forms the basis for the setting aside of any acts that are outside of the stated purposes of the corporation. ' 25 See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 I.
126See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality, 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 REV. , 1280 REV. -81 (2001 (arguing that while the ultra vires doctrine as a way to limit a corporation's activities is generally "dead or at least deathly ill," the only enduring use of the doctrine is as a way for shareholders to stop a corporation from engaging
A B-Corp, on the other hand, is by its nature limited to certain permitted activities.
'2 7 At the very least, a B-Corp is required to identify itself as a benefit corporation in its certificate of incorporation.' 28 As such, the corporation is limited to creating a general public benefit, which is typically defined as "[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation. "' 29 In addition to the general public benefit purpose, a B-Corp can list more specific purposes.' 30 In this context, it is important to note:
The Model [B-Corp Code] explicitly states that "[t]he creation of a general public benefit and specific public benefit ... is in the best interests of the benefit corporation." This serves to protect against the presumption that the financial interests of the corporation take precedence over the public benefit purposes, which maximizes the benefit corporation's flexibility in corporate decision-making." ' Though each state's B-Corp laws contain differing provisions relating to the purpose for which a B-Corp may be formed,'
2 Delaware-the authoritative jurisdiction for corporate law jurisprudence-specifically includes religious activities as a permitted B-Corp purpose.
3 For purposes of this paper, pending the development of further refinements in state B-Corp law, it is assumed that religious activities would be a in illegal behavior, as almost all purpose statements still limit a corporation's permitted purposes to those that arc legal). (defining "specific public benefit"). 3'Clark & Vranka, supra note 1 , at 17. 132Bccause B-Corp statutes arc in their legal infancy, it is still unclear whether the adoption of a specific purpose, such as the advancement of religion, would be subservient to the duty to promote general public benefits. See Wcstaway & Sampscllc, supra note 93, at 1036-37 (discussing various possible interpretations of the relationship between the public benefit sought and other goals).
33See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 362(b) (2013) (emphasis added):
"Public Benefit" means a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on I or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
permitted B-Corp purpose in all states unless a state's B-Corp law explicitly excluded such a purpose.'
A B-Corp with a religious purpose in its statement of purpose should be seen as identical to a non-profit under the Amos First Amendment doctrine, as it can safely be presumed to be an entity organized for, and acting in furtherance of, religious purposes.'" Justice Brennan's concurrence in Amos was clear on this logic: "The fact that an operation is not organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular in orientation. "' 36 If this is true, then the fact that an operation's certificate of incorporation requires it to be operated for religious purposes should remove any doubt, and any further inquiry, as to whether it is entitled to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause protections.' 37 Indeed, the Model B-Corp Code explicitly states the public benefits for which the corporation was established are the corporation's best interests,' and thus take precedence over profit-making activities.' Consequently, to avoid any chilling of protected religious exercise, the government and courts should accord all religious B-Corps the same blanket First Amendment protections that any non-profits receive."°N ot only does a B-Corp have to specify in its certificate of incorporation the benefits that it is obligated to perform, it must also provide an annual report on its progress in performing those benefits.'' Included in the B-Corp's annual report is an analysis of the B-Corp's performance of its social benefit goals compared to a third-party standard 134See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102. 135See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing free exercise rights when an organization's purpose is religious).
136Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
137Cf. id. at 338 (suggesting ample room to recognize the religious rights of various entities).
'1See Clark & Vranka, supra note I1, at 17. '39See Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 93, at 1035-37 (suggesting benefit activities may be more important than profits, although the exact allocation of importance remains unsettled). 140See Amos, 483 U.S. at 344-45 (recognizing religious rights of a religious non-profit to avoid government entanglement). ' 4 1See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2014) (requiring each B-Corp to prepare and publicly publish an annual report consisting of a narrative describing the progress made in providing the stated benefit as well as a report that measures the B-Corp's progress against a third-party standard).
Vol. 39 for performance.' 42 Additionally, a B-Corp may have-and, if it is a publicly traded corporation, is obligated to have-a "Benefit Director," who is a member of the board of directors charged with preparing an opinion describing any failures of the board of directors or officers to fulfill their obligations in providing the B-Corp's stated benefits.' 3 In the event that a B-Corp fails to properly pursue its stated benefit, the Model B-Corp Code provides for a "benefit enforcement proceeding" as a remedy."' A benefit enforcement proceeding can be initiated by either the B-Corp itself, by shareholders, or by directors.' 5 As a further protection, a B-Corp cannot change its status as a B-Corp without the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the B-Corp's shareholders.'" Though many consider the tax status of an entity under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), to be the dispositive test for non-profit status,' 4 7 the truth is that a non-profit corporation, like a for-profit corporation, is a creature of state law.' 48 The provisions of the Code, specifically 501(c)(3), relate solely to the tax status of corporations and similar entities.' 4 9 A corporation organized as a Delaware non-profit corporation, for example, would not necessarily have to be a Code 501(c)(3) entity.' 5° However, courts tend to use the term "non-profit" in a generic way (e.g., the Amos and Conestoga concurring and dissenting opinions)."' For purposes of this paper, 1d. § 102 cmt. ("The requirement in section 401 that a benefit corporation prepare an annual benefit report that assesses its performance in creating general public benefit against a third-party standard provides an important protection against the abuse of benefit corporation status.").
'41d. § 302.
'"Id. § 305(a).
145MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §305(c) (2014). however, the important point is the relevant court decisions that grant non-profits Free Exercise rights while depriving such rights to for-profits do so without any explanation as to the importance of tax status in making such determinations.' 2 Assuming, however, that Code 501(c)(3) status is at the heart of this distinction, since such status is based upon, inter alia, the entity having a religious purpose, the equitable penalty for non-compliance with Code 501(c)(3) is simply the loss of tax-exempt status.' 53 The penalty for a failure to fulfill the purpose of a B-Corp, on the other hand, includes, but is not limited to, a benefit enforcement proceeding that could conceivably include a court-ordered affirmative order to engage in the B-Corp's stated beneficial purpose.' 4 Added up, B-Corp governance procedures provide a guarantee that the entity will be guided by a commitment to public benefit over profit that is at least as robust as the rules that govern non-profits.
5
The Conestoga majority not only misconstrued the Amos non-profit/for-profit distinction, it also failed to consider recent developments in corporate law that rendered the secular/religious corporation distinction irrelevant.' 56 A B-Corp with a stated purpose of promoting religion is,
for Free Exercise purposes, in substance the same as a non-profit,' 57 and like a non-profit, such a B-Corp should be presumed to possess Free Exercise rights.
If the Free Exercise rights of B-Corps are not recognized, it could create a scenario where federal rulemaking causes a corporation to violate its certificate of incorporation and thus subject the board of directors and the corporation to liability under state law.
By way of example, assume that Conestoga Corp. was in fact a BCorp and had stated in its certificate of incorporation the specific public benefit purpose of promoting adherence to Christian principles. If the "' 52 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 330 n.3 (addressing tax status in a cursory manner); Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 390 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (tax status central to majority's holding yet why it should matter is not addressed).
'See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (explaining that the denial of exempt status is the penalty for engaging in political activities).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2012 The Amos court explained the presumption of Free Exercise rights for non-profits by pointing out that " [w] hile not every nonprofit activity may be operated for religious purposes, the likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable means to avoid chilling the. exercise of religion."' 5 9 That same logic militates against the denial of Free Exercise rights to B-Corps. Without such a "categorical rule" (that B-Corps with a stated religious benefit purpose, like non-profits, operate for religious purposes and thus have Free Exercise rights) there is a significant risk of an unacceptable entanglement of government with religion.'" VIII. THE S. 327, 345 (1987) .
160ln this context, the phrase "entanglement with religion" is used in a generic manner. This phrase is often a reference to the three part Lemon test for Establishment Clause cases. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) The answer to this question is to grant for-profit corporations that have a demonstrable religious purpose "de facto B-Corp" status for First Amendment purposes. It is important to remember that the original reason for establishing the presumption that non-profits have Free Exercise rights was to avoid the chilling of religious expression when the corporate actor was likely to be operating for religious purposes. 66 The
Amos Court used the most expedient test that was relevant for its time, which was the non-profit/for-profit distinction.' 67 The rise of B-Corps, however, provides a more precise basis for the presumption, 6 and one that will ensure less court entanglement in religious questions. Ct. 2751 Ct. , 2764 Ct. -66 (2013 . (explaining that while the companies are incorporated as for-profit incorporations, they hold sincere religious beliefs). facto corporation status, but Delaware's is illustrative.' In Delaware, a court will deem a corporation to exist even if it has not been properly formed under the state's law.' 73 The general theory behind the de facto corporation doctrine is that when a party has made a bonafide attempt to organize as a corporation and it is likely that others have dealt with the entity, assuming that it was a corporation, the courts should give legal effect to the expectations of the various parties.' 74 A Delaware court will examine three factors to determine whether de facto corporate status should apply. "5 First, there must be a state law under which the corporation could have been formed.' 76 Next, there must be some evidence of an intent to form the corporation and comply with the corporate governance laws.' 7 Finally, there must have been some exercise of corporate powers in furtherance of the attempted incorporation.'
In the case of a de facto B-Corp, the standard Delaware test' 9 could be easily modified and implemented to provide Free Exercise rights to a corporation that has a religious purpose. In the event the putative de facto B-Corp is in a state that does not have B-Corp legislation, 8 ' the court can look to the Model B-Corp Code. To prove evidence of intent to form a B-Corp, the court can look to see if the corporation has a purpose statement that includes a religious goal or if its board has adopted standards of conduct and operations that are religious in nature.'"' Finally, the court can look to see whether there had been an exercise of corporate powers that showed the company was being operated with an emphasis on religious purpose. "'Cf. id. §301(a) (providing for enumerated standards of conduct/operations for directors, which could be religious).
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Vol. 39 three elements existed, the court would deem the corporation a de facto B-Corp for First Amendment purposes.' 3 It may take many years before the B-Corp is established in all fifty states and even more time before a robust body of B-Corp jurisprudence exists such that the B-Corp becomes sufficiently well known, and small business lawyers can guide their clients through the transition from a traditional for-profit corporation to a B-Corp." 4 However, the mere existence of the B-Corp as a legal corporate, for-profit entity with a religious purpose (if the shareholders so choose) proves that there is a much larger world than the one imagined by the Conestoga majority and its rigid "religious non-profit/secular for-profit" dichotomy.' 5 Until such time as B-Corp legislation exists in all fifty states and is familiar to all levels of business advisors, " status as a defacto B-Corp with attendant Free Exercise rights should inure to any for-profit corporation that asserts a religious purpose. '86See Schocnjahn, supra note 184, at 471-72 (describing lack of case law on B-Corps and potential hurdles to large-scale adoption of B-Corps by states). The choice to change the corporate form from a traditional for-profit corporation to a B-Corp will necessarily require business owners to consult with tax, financial, legal and other advisors to ensure that all aspects of the change are accounted for and understood. Consequently, it will take some time before the process of incorporating a B-Corp or converting an existing corporation or limited liability company to a B-Corp becomes routine and affordable. From this important point, Justice Alito applied the RFRA's strict scrutiny standard to the ACA Contraceptive Mandate and found that the mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion, and while the government interest in women's health was compelling, the ACA Contraceptive Mandate was not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest."° With that, the ACA Contraceptive Mandate was found to violate the RFRA rights of closely held corporations."'
The majority qualified its opinion by reference to "closely held" corporations, rather than to corporations generally (for-and not-forprofit), because the three corporations that were parties to the suit were all closely held, and the United States Supreme Court tries to keep its decisions as limited to the instant facts as possible."° Because no nonclosely held corporations were parties, there was no need to explicitly rule on their rights."°7 This supposition is borne out by Justice Alito's response to the dissent's concern that the decision would give rise to large publicly held corporations seeking to deny benefits based on religious beliefs." 8 the corporation and the other challengers and thus implicitly recognized their right to assert a frcc-cxcrcisc claim. Finally, Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which was joined by Justice Harlan, upheld the Massachusetts law on the merits but did not question or reserve decision on the issue of the right of the corporation or any of the other challengers to be heard. It is quite a stretch to argue that RFRA, a law enacted to provide very broad protection for religious liberty, left for-profit corporations unprotected simply because in Gallagherthe only prc-Smith case in which the issue was raiscd-a majority of the Justices did not find it necessary to decide whether the kosher market's corporate status barred it from raising a free-exercise claim. '6See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (speculating that RFRA claims were unlikely to be brought by publicly traded corporations and that the holding did not need to be so broad on the instant facts).
2O7id. 208d.:
These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which [the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")] refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders-including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders-would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable. In any event, we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA's applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.
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The key issue in both RFRA and First Amendment Free Exercise cases, is not the number of shareholders; rather, it is whether the entitybe it an individual or a corporation-is acting, or failing to act, upon sincere religious beliefs."° It just so happens that the fewer the shareholders, the easier it would be to discern their interests (and thus, the corporation's interests)." ' So as a matter of expediency, the Court focused on closely held corporations in deciding Hobby Lobby et al."' Indeed, Justice Alito went so far as to say that under the RFRA, federal courts were expected to undertake an examination of the sincerity of a for-profit corporation that claimed it was exercising religion."' The case for recognizing the free exercise rights of B-Corps (de jure and de facto) was made stronger by Justice Alito's discussion of the subject matter of this paper in response to the dissent's and the government's assertions that the profit motive of for-profit corporations vitiated any claim they may have to the exercise of religion."' Justice Alito pointed out that under B-Corp legislation, a corporation can be formed to further social goals, including religious goals. "1d. at 2774 n.28 ("To qualify for RFRA's protection, an asserted belief must be 'sincere'; a corporation's pretcxtual assertion of a religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail.") (citing U.S. v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718-19 (10th Cir. 2010 Not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so in order to maximize profit. For example, organizations with religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential advantages of that corporate form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candidates who promote their religious or charitable goals. In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize the "benefit corporation," a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.
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This line of reasoning applies to free exercise questions raised under the First Amendment as well as the RFRA.
5
The majority opinion clearly rejected the claim that pre-Smith First Amendment precedent precluded Free Exercise rights for for-profit corporations." 6 Furthermore, the arguments in favor of recognizing RFRA free exercise rights of corporations, whether they are de jure B-Corps, de facto BCorps or closely held corporations, are based on the same principles as one would use in reviewing a case under First Amendment Free Exercise precedent. 2 ' 7 One only has to look at Justice Brennan's Amos concurrence to see that Justice Alito reiterated the enduring constitutional precedent that as long as a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs are found to be sincere, that corporation is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. However, it is clear from the general discussion of the potential for religious exercise by for-profit corporations and, in particular B-Corps, that this decision applies equally to other for-profit corporations that have sincere religious beliefs. 3 The defacto B-Corp analysis outlined herein would be true to the principles contained in Justice Alito's majority opinion as well as First Amendment and RFRA precedent. 24 It has been suggested by those unhappy with the Hobby Lobby et al. decision that Congress should amend the RFRA to explicitly exclude for-profit corporations from its coverage. 225 If this were to be done, forprofit corporations would have to rely upon the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause from before and after Smith if they sought to challenge the ACA Contraceptive Mandate. 6 Though a robust discussion of First Amendment Free Exercise clause jurisprudence post-Smith is outside the scope of this paper, 27 a few principles thereof are generally agreed upon. First, the "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability ..".'.,," For neutral laws of general applicability, the standard of review under the First Amendment Free Exercise clause is rational basis, while for laws that are either not neutral or not generally applied, the standard of review under
